DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 272 934 CS 505 304

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TITLE The Debate Judge as Educator [and] Responses.
PUB DATE Aug 85
NOTE 46p.; Papers presented at the National Forensic League Conference on the State of Debate (Kansas City, MO, August 8-10, 1985).
PUB TYPE Viewpoints (120) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Debate; Educational Improvement; *Educational Objectives; *Evaluation Criteria; High Schools; *Judges; Models; *Persuasive Discourse; Speech Communication; *Standards; Teaching Methods

ABSTRACT

The purpose of the three papers that make up this document is to explore and redefine the role of debate judges. The first paper, by Leslie Phillips, begins with the assertion that the debate judge is first and foremost an educator, notes that judging is one of the forces that shape and direct competitive forensics, and goes on to consider practitioners' failure to conceive a clear educational role for the judge, and to examine some of the reasons for this failure. The paper also proposes some modest steps toward better, more "educational" judging. The second paper, a response by G. David Richardson, focuses on the variance of educational philosophies with the role of the critic-judge. The paper argues that the inquiry approach to education is most consistent and harmonious with the structure of policy debate. It also considers Phillips's brief treatment of paradigms as educational devices, giving specific attention to the tabula rasa paradigms and their implications for the educator-judge. Finally, the paper offers some modifications and amendments to Phillips's recommendations for improving the educational function of judging. The third paper, a response to Phillips by John Durkee, notes positions of consensus: (1) it is necessary to have a clear awareness of the judge as critic/educator, and (2) it is desirable that the judge let the student debaters know something about individual judging preferences. The paper then explores R. Rowland's debate judging paradigm and Phillips's tabula rasa paradigm and their feasibility as universal judging standards. Finally, the paper discusses the use of lay judges in debate, describing two natural controls that insure such use will not distort the educational nature of debate, and argues that Rowland's Debate Judge paradigm is a perfect format for judges to follow. (HTH)

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THE DEBATE JUDGE AS EDUCATOR

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Prepared for the NFL
Conference on the Future
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Kansas City, Missouri
August, 1985

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Any discussion of the judge's role in debate must begin with one central statement: The debate judge is first and foremost an educator. Debate is a contest, even a game, but it is a game devised by educators, and education is its ultimate goal. Debate tournaments are great fun, and they build character, but ultimately they are motivational ploys to get students to learn. Judging is one of the forces which shape and direct the competitive activity. It is standards of judging which frame, and name, what the competition is all about. We are a community of teachers who devote extraordinary amounts of time to debate, presumably because we feel it is a unique educational experience -- yet we spend next to no time in serious thinking and writing about how we, as educators, should judge. This paper will consider our failure to conceive a clear educational role for the judge, examine some of the reasons for this failure, and propose some modest steps toward better, more "educational", judging.

When debate educators think of "judging philosophies", they often think of paradigm theory. Much of our discussion of judging flows from these theories, which are essentially aimed at a characterization of what a debate round should be. Should the judge be a stock issues judge? Should s/he be a policy maker? A hypothesis tester? Most thoughtful debate coaches would agree that each of these paradigms of debate, while contributing markedly to our thinking about what a debate round should be, are in themselves imperfect guides to what a debate judge should do. First, just because the judge chooses to hew to a given theoretical model does not mean that the debaters will play along. Even the most sophisticated high school debaters rarely execute an entire debate round

in strict adherence to the assumptions of a given paradigm. More often they mix arguments from many different theoretical schools and leave the judge to clean up the loose ends. In such a situation, calling oneself a policy maker, and using policy making principles to try to decude a round, may not take a judge very far. Paradigm rules are no help in untangling semantic confusion, deciding how far to go in supplying premises which debaters imply but leave unstated, weighing values, or judging the adequacy of evidence. It is not clear that any paradigm can give a judge solutions to these problems.

Second, the models themselves are flawed. The stock issues paradigm is a simple, useful model for teaching beginning students the essential protocols of academic debate, but I think its usefulness ends there. Its rather arbitrary requirements for affirmative cases bear scant resemblance to the requirements imposed by actual decisionmakers, and are difficult to justify to students, soon begin to question their <u>a priori</u> status. The policy making paradigm evolved as a response to precisely those deficiencies. However, even the most enthusiastic policy makers could not claim that the analogy of debate to government policy making can be taken very far.[1] Is the debate judge a judge in court? Many questions debated are not policies decided or enacted by judges. Is s/he an entire legislative body? The complex process of legislation bears little resemblance to what we do in debate rounds. Where are the veto, the referral to committee, the endless amendments? The analogy to scientific experimentation which stands at the root of the hypothesis testing paradigm is similarly incomplete. Hypothesis testing theory is a significant contribution to debate.

It has redirected our attention to the function of the resolution, and to the necessity for rigorous testing. But it has never been clear, at least to me, why a contest of issues of policy, conducted between high school students, should be thought analogous to scientific experimentation -- for starters, the scientist is testing propositions of fact, and the debaters are testing propositions of policy.

I must seem to be indicting the classic debate paradigms for not providing magical solutions to all our judging problems. Of course, Lichtman and Rohrer and Zarefsky and Patterson and Bishop Whately make no such pretense. They ask the question, "What is a debate round? What is the nature of policy dispute?" Judges of course must concern themselves with another question: "How should I decide who wins? And what else should I do?" Here paradigm theory does not help very much. Paradigm theory may tell the judge what type of affirmative or negative case must be made for that side to prevail, but they give him or her no guidance on how to decide whether the case has, in fact, been made. Most important, paradigms do not guide the judge as educator. Even when they guide decision, they do not guide education, except insofar as the biases inbred in each paradigm (in policy making, content specificity; in hypothesis testing, abstract or theoretical argument, and so on) may direct the student to emphasize some skills and not others.

Many coaches feel that the true educator comes to the activity as a "skills judge". They would reward solid reasoning, appropriate support with evidence, flexible, adaptive thinking,

and good speaking, and penalize debaters who do not display these qualities. As more and more coaches have become frustrated with the trend away from simple arguments and clear presentation, the skills judge approach to debate has become more tempting. The difficulty with a "skills" paradigm is that it isolates the means of policy discussion -- the student's communicative skill -- from its end, which is the resolution of the issue under discussion. Public speaking events are probably better places to develop particular presentation skills. There is a strong argument for requiring debaters to practice extemporaneous speaking, oratory, and even intepretation events. They can learn a great deal about organization, rhetoric, physical delivery, and vocal control that way. Yet debate is the synthesis of many different skills, directed toward the special goal of persuading a special audience of the truth or falsity of a complex series of arguments. To evaluate the means independent of the end tends to undermine the educational purpose of the activity. Skills judging corrects one bias by substituting an opposite, and potentially more harmful, bias.

Of course, many judges adhere to no fixed philosophy, preferring ring to regard themselves as "blank slate" or "tabula rasa" judges. I want to give the "tabula rasa" approach a great deal of attention in this paper, because it provokes a question which stands at the center of our thinking about judging: How objective should a judge be? Most coaches and teachers would agree that judges should not allow bias or gross personal prejudice to determine their decisions, and I suspect most would agree that judges should decide "on the basis of what is argued in the round." Walter Ulrich, a major proponent of strict tabula rasa judging, has argued that tabula rasa

is preferable because it is most consistent with the adversary process, is a good way to teach argumentation theory, and prevents judges from injecting biases into rounds.[2] Many coaches, and many more debaters, regard tabula rasa as the principle which best insures fair, reliable judging. Yet tabula rasa is under siege. The most common criticism of the blank slate principle is that it is often a rationalization for a passive judging style which abdicates both critical and teaching responsibilities. William Reynolds, one of the most distinguished figures in college forensics, has made one of the best cases for this point of view in his 1974 Sedalia Conference paper:

> ". . . are judges to be viewed as computers whose decisions depend wholly upon the programming they receive in the course of the debate? Or, on the other hand, are they <u>critics</u> whose proper role includes more than merely adding up arguments? Have they the independent right to reject information that does not correspond to their own factual knowledge? Have they the power to reject arguments whose development violates both the canons of logic and common sense rules of evidence? Are they free to disregard approaches that run contrary to human behavior or common experience?"[3]

Of course, Reynolds's answer to all these questions is, "Yea, verily!" He likens the judge's attempt at balancing objectivity and educational responsibility to "walking a tightrope; the judge simultaneously must neither intrude too much nor abdicate completely from his or her role as a critic."[4] To Reynolds, strict adherence to tabula rasa has led too many judges to abandon the critic's role, with grave consequences for the quality of the activity.

A more recent paper by Robert Rowland accepts many goals

of tabula rasa, but notes that no such standard can guarantee objectivity. Rowland argues that, since there is necessarily ambiguity and semantic confusion in any debate round, judges must generally inject themselves into the round in some way to make decisions. He also argues that tabula rasa encourages too much "meta-argument," by which he chiefly means argument about theory, and he proposes amendments to tabula rasa which would permit judges to disregard specified types of arguments.[5] To Rowland, policy dispute is the center of debate, and theoretical dispute has begun to crowd it out. He remarks that "Rationality does not demand that all issues be open to dispute in all forums. The degree to which arguers should be allowed to debate an issue depends on the purpose of the activity."[6] And certainly many high school coaches would uphold this view.

I have often argued that tabula rasa offers the least potential for bias and arbitrariness in the judging process, and that fair, scrutable judging of debate rounds is critical to insuring the value of the activity. One can hold this view and still agree with Reynolds and Rowland that fairness and scrutability, though necessary, are probably not sufficient. Any coach who has been to a tournament and heard dreadful arguments, offered only in the hope that they will be overlooked or mishandled by the other team, knows one of the great weaknesses of tabula rasa. Blank slate judging often produces another class of abuse. Week after week, I read ballots from proud blank slate judges. Their ballots are proudly blank. They offer technical description of the debate, often in painstaking detail. But when I look for evaluative comments, constructive suggestions, or any sign that the judge has done more

than process the information fed to her or him by the debaters, I come up emptyhanded.

If tabula rasa judging avoids some arbitrariness and unfairness, it also permits excesses. That much is clear. But it is not at all clear that a major philosophical revision in the way judges carry out judgment is called for. It is particularly questionable whether we should adopt any sort of legislation which prescribes which "excesses" judges should discount or punish. There are two major reasons why.

The first is that, to put it mildly, there is little consensus within the forensics community on what constitutes excess or bad argument. I find that many of my colleagues are united in their denunciation of "silly arguments, mindless speed, brief reading," and so on. I also find that they often have quite different interpretations of which arguments are silly or mindless, and they apply those interpretations very differently in a debate round. Even the 1974 Sedalia Conference was carefully ambiguous in its pronouncements on what a judge should do. Many conference recommendations stressed the need for educational responsibility, and hinted at rationales for judge intervention.

On page 15:

> "Forensics has a societal responsibility to promote rational decision making and to provide training in adapting argumentation to a variety of audiences and situations."[7]

On page 25:

8.

> "The critic-judge has the responsibility to insure that the decision rendered and the criticism given promote the objectives of the activity. When a critic-judge becomes passive in the role of choice-maker, practices may be permitted that damage these objectives. The critic-judge has the responsibility to make judgments on the basis of the educational objectives of the activities and to offer a critique to assist students to achieve them."[8]

Yet in other recommendations, the conference seemed to accept the principles of blank slate:

> "The appropriateness of . . . paradigms should be determined primarily by the process of argumentation. . . . Only in those instances where the students themselves have failed to agree upon the bases for reasonable interpretation of the proposition should the judge exercise his or her individual and carefully considered judgment."[9]

Behold the debate community, artfully dodging The Question. We are all walking Reynolds's tightrope, and we are not likely to find a way to get off. We disagree on too much. We all agree that arguments should be sound, that evidence should be carefully chosen and supportive of argument, that persuasion has a major role in advocacy, and that debate should educate. Such propositions are unarguable. But an objective definition of "good argument" is very difficult to arrive at. One reason is that argument is almost always enthymematic, a contract between arguer and audience. An advocate sets out some premises, and assumes that the audience will provide others from its store of experience, knowledge, and received assumptions. When an audience shares common experience and values, it may be able to agree on what "good argument" is. Conversely, different audiences with different values will favor different arguments.

There is nothing sinister in this diversity, but it is difficult for many debate educators to accept it. There used to be more agreement on debate theory and practice. Debate educators no longer share a body of common experience and training. I would guess that twenty years ago a much larger percentage of debate teachers had degrees in speech. Many had debated in high school and college at a time when debate theory was very nearly monolithic. They passed those values on to their students, some of whom became debate teachers, and so on. This process is breaking down. The demographics of education and the concomitant politics of funding are robbing the public schools of an entire generation of young teachers. Many fewer young speech majors, or college debaters, enter teaching. Many more debate coaches are content specialists in other areas, and they hold other values. In their Sedalia paper, Malcolm Sillars and David Zarefsky urged us to recognize that "Although the substantive concerns of forensics derive clearly from speech communication, they do not derive <u>uniquely</u> from that field."[10] People from other disciplines have much to contribute to debate, and they are likely to be oriented toward content rather than style. Of course, many programs have no coaching at all. Increasingly, trained debate coaches must share the field not only with specialists in argumentation theory and intelligent teachers from fields other than speech, but with good-natured parents, guidance counselors, and bus drivers, bad-natured chemistry teachers who have sold their Saturdays for a stipend, and worse. The widespread retreat of college speech departments from leadership in forensics makes it less and less likely that diverse parties will gain the background

they need, or come together on common ground. In this climate, it is unwise to demand that judges enforce a prescribed agenda in debate rounds. Each segment of the community will read into that agenda a completely different understanding of what the agenda means. The only group unlikely to achieve a consistent understanding of such an agenda is the group which should most concern us: the debaters. The only certain result will be the abandonment of the virtues of blank slate judging -- objectivity, freedom from bias, an emphasis on the student's argument rather than the judge's pre-conception -- without eliminating its defects. And a new danger will be substituted -- judges, who up to now have been at least mildly constrained from intervening in the round, will feel licensed to impose all kinds of biases and preconditions on the debaters.

The second reason to retain the blank slate is that judging is not our only educational tool. Who won, who lost, and why need not be so prominent in our thinking. Professor Reynolds is completely correct when he says that the role of the critic has largely been abdicated. We call ourselves critic-judges, but most of us forget the first half of that compound designation. The critical task is not discharged merely by rendering judgment. And I would submit that, as long as we are aggressive and rigorous as critics, we may safely remain detached and, yes, even passive as judges.

But how are we to use criticism? We hear bad arguments and bad speaking, plenty of it, every weekend. The criticisms we do offer don't seem to do much to discourage bad debate. I think that, quite simply, we need to try harder, and I offer the following modest proposals toward better criticism. They will not turn debate upside down, not right away, but they can make a difference.

1. Judges should issue reasonably detailed statements of their judging philosophy before the round begins. Nothing in debate has ever prevented a judge from enforcing his or her philosophy in a round, and many judges do so -- it's just that they don't let the debaters know what that philosophy is. I often find that judges who are quite insistent on a particular credo, and who value most highly debaters' ability to adapt to that credo, often neglect and even resist disclosing their standards to the debaters. The statement should announce practices which a judge dislikes, and will punish; which paradigm, if any, the judge believes in; what types of arguments (topicality, disadvantages, etc.) the judge considers him or herself partial to, and so forth. It has long been common on the college circuit for tournament directors to solicit written philosophy statements from judges, and to duplicate them in booklets and distribute them to debaters. This practice should be encouraged, where practical. But at the very least, judges should say what they like before the round, particularly if they like something unusual. To provide anything less is simply unfair to the student.

2. Although the rationale for decision is still the most important part of a debate ballot, judges should work harder at evaluating the debaters's skills, particularly as they relate to the student's effectiveness as an advocate. This means more than scattered comments on delivery and organization. The judge needs to go one step further and explain, quite specifically, what skills a team needs to develop in order to argue more effectively. Exactly what changes in the organization of the 1AC are needed?

Has the team chosen the strongest arguments for or against a particular position? Which would be stronger? Are the debaters talking at their maximum effective speed? How could the debaters explain their links or impacts more effectively? Did the second negative rebuttalist extend the correct response to the affirmative's turnaround? If not, which argument would have been better? Did the debaters use practices which the judge considered detrimental to the educational experience? Many coaches lack the time or expertise to provide good criticism; few get the change to see their students perform, and they need a thorough and constructive report. If we must develop a longer, more directive debate ballot, or give judges more time to write their ballots, or even, God forbid, give judges some rounds off so that they may write better ballots, so be it. The gain in education will be well worth it.

3. Judges should use speaker points to reinforce their comments on the quality of argument. I make this suggestion with some trepidation, knowing that some judges are already willing to fire 10's and 12's at debaters who offend them. Yet many other judges no longer use speaker points as evaluative or motivational tools. On my circuit, the formula is settled. Teams who break to late elimination rounds get 28's and 29's in prelims; teams who usually clear get 27's; teams with winning records get 26's; teams who break even get 25's, and the rest of the pack get 24's. An occasional 23 is awarded to a novice who has mistakenly wandered into the varsity division. This pattern is rarely broken, even when a speaker has an "off" round. When there is only a five or six-point range of demarcation between the best debater and the

poorest, the points have lost all meaning. Many judges who hold strong opinions still do not use points to send a message. The message can be framed constructively through comments on the ballot, and the points need not be so low that they vastly distort the outcome of the competition, but the mechanism should be used.

4. The debate community should work to insure that all judges share a minimal common knowledge of the protocols of academic debate. Judges should know the stock issues, speaker responsibilities, and basic terminology of the activity. Judges should take flows. Many coaches feel that the decline in standards of argument and evidence can be corrected by conducting more debates in front of lay judges. I think that forensics educators certainly should train students in a wide range of speaking activities. Practice in extemporaneous speaking, particularly, can help debaters make arguments clear to a general audience. Audience debate before community groups can also be valuable. Lay judges are very useful in these contexts -- and that is where they should remain. Academic debate is a unique activity because it encourages a disciplined, systematic approach to thinking and arguing about limited, specialized questions. It is not supposed to be equally accessible to everyone. To train students in a specialized activity and then submit them to judging by people who are ignorant of the activity's unique features is a betrayal of our students. There are many other ways to teach adaptation.

It is true that there are fewer and fewer qualified judges available, partly for reasons which I have already discussed. That only means that we have to work harder to train judges. The

colleges, state leagues, and NFL can work together to do the necessary training; we can do it if we try.

5. Everyone needs to work harder to improve judging. Local and state leagues, university speech departments, NFL district committees, and the NFL national organization should use literature, workshops, and guidelines (not rules) to teach judges to become better educators. Hardly a week passes without a new coach asking me, "How do I judge?" There are people who want to learn. The way to teach them is not to tell them what standards they should or must impose, but to help them learn how to develop, and then apply, their own standards. If the leaders of debate education in this country take the initiative, it can be done.

Many in this room may feel as though these suggestions are mere band-aids on a gaping mortal wound. If the mortal wound they have in mind is the crisis in forensics, they may be correct. I think there is a crisis in forensics, but only a small part of it is caused by judging. Our problems are not created by bogeymen from the colleges, and will not be cured by sending the bogeymen away. Our crisis is a teaching crisis. When our students speak badly, argue illogically, or resort to sophistry, it is because someone has not taught them a suitable alternative. But judges are educators too, and we must train them, and ourselves, to perform the dual role of judge and critic as conscientiously and intelligently as possible.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Bill Balthrop, "Citizen, Legislator, and Bureaucrat as Evaluators of 'Competing Policy Systems', in David A. Thomas (ed.), Advanced Debate. Skokie: National Textbook, 1979, pp. 402-418.
2. See Walter Ulrich, "Debate As Dialectic: A Defense of the Tabula Rasa Approach to Judging," Journal of the American Forensic Association, Fall 1984, pp. 89-93
3. William Reynolds, "Theory and Practice in Forensics," in James H. McBath, ed., Forensics as Communication, Skokie: National Textbook, 1975, p. 113.
4. Reynolds, p. 113
5. See Robert Rowland, "Tabula Rasa: The Relationship of Debate to Argumentation Theory, " Journal of the American Forensic Association, Fall 1984, pp. 76-88.
6. Rowland, p. 87.
7. National Developmental Conference on Forensics, "Recommendations Adopted by the Conference," in McBath, p. 15.
8. National Developmental Conference on Forensics, p. 25.
9. National Developmental Conference on Forensics, p. 30.
10. Malcolm O. Sillars and David Zarefsky, "Future Goals and Roles of Forensics," in McBath, p. 87.
11. I was recently on a panel in a national tournament elimination round with a man who interrupted a student's constructive speech. He announced that the argument the student was making was "against the rules." Even if the judge had been correct in his declaration (he was not), which violates the spirit of the activity more? The student's violation of a rule, or the judge's sudden disruption of student performance?

Response to: "The Debate Judge as Educator" by Leslie Phillips

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August 10, 1985

Attempting to combine the role of debate judge and educator is a little like telling someone he must serve the dual function of defense attorney and Lord High Executioner, simultaneously. However, there are areas where these two disparate roles can be reconciled. The following remarks will focus primarily on Mr. Phillips' observations and recommendations, but will admittedly address some issues germane to the judge-educator role not dealt with in the preceding paper.

I will attempt to focus on several areas suggested in Mr. Phillips' paper. The initial area will be the variance of educational philosophies with the role of the critic-judge. Here the main premise is that the inquiry approach to education is most consistent and harmonious with the structure of policy debate. The next area to be considered will be Mr. Phillips' unneccessarily brief treatment of paradigms as educational devices. Specific attention will be given to the tabula rasa paradigms and its implications for the educator-judge. We will also examine Mr. Phillips" specific recommendations for improving the educational function of judging. I will offer some modifications and amendments to these recommendations.

Debate occupies a unique place in the academic world. It draws from the social sciences with frequent forays into the natural and physical sciences, while remaining firmly grounded in language arts. Several years ago, Dr. Rohrer suggested that debate was itself intrinsically a liberal art.[1]

It would seem that with all of these trappings of academia, little justification for its education function would be needed. Mr. Phillips, however posits that tournaments function as "motivational ploys" to get young people to learn. He further suggests that the judge should play a more carefully defined role as an educator.

While conceding that education is a critical component of our activity perhaps we should not be overly zealous in our attempts to "educationally" justify all facets of competitive debate in our high schools. Tournaments need not be viewed as gimmicks to entice young people into learning. Certainly tournaments can be viewed as valuable entities in themselves without having to conceive of them as pedagogical devices. The students who participate in debate usually have more insight than to see their hours of work as merely "motivational ploys". The students realize the educational value without having to be told they are participating in a "learning experience". Most people in the field believe that debate is a co-curricular as opposed to extra-curricular activity. There is no disgrace, loss of integrity or diminished benefits when we see debate as simply a fulfilling activity that also happens to teach analytical skills, self-confidence, decision making, composition, self-expression, political science, and coutless other skills better than virtually any other medium yet devised by educators.

The key to understanding how debate accomplishes these educational ends lies primarily in analysis of the learning process itself.

Educational theorists since Socrates have observed that education is an active process for the learner. Whether we call it the inquiry method, learning-by-doing, the discovery method, induction, or inferential learning it all involves the concept that learning is not so much a process of teacher input as student output. The student gains insight through involvement not through simply being told what is important. This fundamental education precept has important implications when applied to the processes involved in competitive debate. One of these implications is the role of the judge.

The focus of the learning process in debate must be in the preparation for and participation in debate as opposed to the critique of it by a judge. Mr. Phillips addresses what he calls "the failure to achieve a clear educational role for the judge". Perhaps we overstate this educational role somewhat. Our own experience tells us these wonderful moments of insight, the cognitive epiphanies of our activity, take place through discovery in research and during debate rounds. The acquisition of knowledge is a descriptive not a prescriptive process. It follows that the judges' role should be descriptive. Certainly the judge should be encouraged to offer helpful advice especially to inexperienced debaters. However, to portray the judges "as walking the tightrope" suggested by Reynolds and referred to by Mr. Phillips may be an inaccurate metaphor for the judges' role. The educator-judge runs the risk of role-conflict when evaluating the presentation of arguments.

The educator who takes a prescriptive role in evaluating a debate would find this inconsistent with the tabula rasa position on evaluating the issues in the round. If we view the practices in the round from a critics' stance we are applying perceived, standards of acceptable behavior. We can accept only that which is known or intuitively seems allowable. Rejecting counter-intuitive arguments is of course inconsistent for a tabula rasa judge. Very little of the spectrum of human knowledge is absolute. Ideas once held to be absurd have become accepted as true over sometimes relatively short periods of time. Virtually all disciplines accept new ideas for scrutiny. We cannot afford to reject "out-of-hand" ideas and practices because they do not conform to our currently held beliefs. No educator will claim that his knowledge and beliefs are identical to those he held ten years ago. The educator must allow the principle of inquiry to guide the debater-learner. The critic portion of his role would be less "judgemental" especially for the debater who has mastered the fundamentals of argument. The judge who is overzealous in his role as "educator" in the prescriptive sense must of needs intervene not only on issues but in the process. The tabula rasa approach permits disputation of debate theory but seldom of educational theory. Thus, even this judge imposes his own concepts into the critique of the round, which may unduly constrain the inquiry process.

But what of abusive, trival or irrational lines of argument? Will they not proliferate if the judge doesn't "put the clamps" on it? There are modifications in the tabula rasa process which can check frivolous arguments better than the crusades of a few reactionary judges. These will be discussed in a later section.

There is another barrier to attaining an educator role for debate judges. This is the nature of the judging population. Many times debaters have to present sophisticated arguments to unsophisticated listeners. Conversely, many of our judges are skilled in the competitive, technical aspects of debate but are not necessarily skilled educators. Debaters can "learn" in front of both kinds of judges. The insights and communications skills they develop through these varied experiences are valuable, but rarely because the judge assumed the role of prescriptive educator. The aim should not be to make our judges consistent in debate philosophy, but rather for us to be educationally consistent in our perception of the role of the judge as an evaluator of arguments rather than a prescriber of behavior. This diversity of debate philosophies is our next concern.

Judging paradigms can serve not only as means of evaluating issues, but can also serve crucial education functions. Mr. Phillips observes that "...they (paradigms) do not guide education except insofar as the biases inbred in each paradigm may direct the student to emphasize some skills and not others." If we emphasize the inquiry element of debate then we must oppose this observation and maintain that paradigms serve significant educational functions for the judge-educator as well as the debater. The debater-learner gains a grasp of abstract processes rather than just declarative data by understanding paradigms. The judge can also guide this inquiry and his evaluation of the issues by application of a paradigm. Debaters should be encouraged to explore issues using different frameworks

or yardsticks. If paradigms aid the judge by making his decision- making more consistent and more intensive has he not served a crucial educational function by demanding more rigorous inquiry on the part of the debater? Most recently paradigms have not been used so much as competing options in a round but as means of developing rational persepectives on issues more effectively and intensively. We are seeing an evolution away from exchanging slogans ("Hyp. testing is superior" - "policy making equals better decisions") as arguments, toward applications of paradigms. Debaters now tend to argue whether a disadvantage must be instrinsic according to the policy making perspective or why inherency is or is not a resolutionally-based issue according to the hypothesis tester.

Mr. Phillips disposes of policy making and hypothesis testing a bit too abruptly by mentioning only some limitations of each. The present writer feels compelled to briefly respond to a couple of these oversights.

Mr. Phillips observes that the policy maker must adopt a sort of psuedo-role as a legislator, trial judge, etc. This is not mandated by taking a policy systems approach. Balthrop notes the following;

> "The actions recommended and defended by the affirmative and the negative are advocated not in isolation but in relation to other components and functions. They are in other words defined as policy systems."[2]

The systems concept allows the judge to compare systems as a debate judge attempting to resolve arguments presented by debaters not "real world" policy advocates convincing a real world policy maker. A further distinction is made depending on whether one views the debate round as a process of policy advocacy or policy making.

Hypothesis testing is disposed of as being an awkward analogy between science and policy arguments. This analogy is somewhat facile and is not the intent of hypothesis testing. Zarefsky and Henderson vigorously deny this application when they observe "...the central assumption of the paradigm (Hypothesis testing) is that scientific methods cannot (italics are the authors') be used to determine the probable truth of statements of value or policy."[3] They further note that the analogy is "...figurative not literal. The point is not that the two enterprises are basically alike (for clearly they are not) but that they share the same goal of determing whether statements presented for our consideration are probably true."[4] It is impossible to overlook the effect hypthesis testing has had on current debate practices. Once again underscoring the value of paradigms as a tool of educational inquiry.

The tabula rasa judging perspective is given more treatment in Mr. Phillips' paper. He makes some productive headway in attempting to resolve the paradox of using a "blank-slate" on the issues and applying a preset education perspective on the critical commentary role of the judge. There does appear to be a dissonance: Mr. Phillips apparently accepts the "yes" response to Reynolds' question "have they (judges) the independent right to reject information that does not correspond to their own factual knowledge?" This would license a judge to vote against any counter-intuitive argument presented in a round. Innovations are by their nature counter-intuitive. Many ideas whether empirical or probabilistic observations on policies were at one time contradictory to accepted knowledge (shape of the earth, molecular theory, slavery, women's suffrage, etc.) This is antithetical to

educational goals whether inquiry-oriented or educator-judge oriented.

Finally we arrive at the issue of how best to discourage poor argumentation. Phillips observes, that tabula rasa has been frequently identified as the genesis of many trivial and irrational arguments. It is first necessary to ascertain how extensive these argumentative excesses are in current usage. Many of the arcane arguments may actually serve education functions when viewed as the result of creative thinking. If the arguments are absurd they will be proven so and fairly judged so. We should not be hasty in our condemnation of certain arguments as frivolous, abusive or inane. Once again we may be "knee-jerking" because they are counter-intuitive. In reality, how many rounds turn on really silly arguments? Even if an occasional round centers on obtuse procedural arguments, is this the death knell for our beloved activity? Or is it just an occasional anomalous experience? In actuality most rounds still find their crux in substantive, issue-oriented arguments. Often these tactics seen as "excesses" are the work of students who have attained a level of competence in debate fundamentals. Thus the source of the arguments may be in a solid understanding of argumentation rather than ignorance of it. This maybe in the manner of an artist who may experiment with a form he is familiar with. Great caution should be used here to avoid debaters' attempts to "run before they can walk".

The most effective way to deal with truly poor arguments is to expose them to the rigorous analysis of the adversary process. If they are unsound they will be proven so. The tests of reasoning and proof can still be applied to arguments regardless of what paradigm is employed.

Probable truth can still be tested by observing the claim and warrant requirements of sound argument. Rowland offers some practical applications of this principle. He suggests that judges apply a simple "burden of proof" test to arguments. This standard need not be overly stringent, it merely requires "that every claim be supported by some reasoning and evidence which he or she understand as supporting the claim."[5] This would discourage frivolous and irrational arguments without needlessly stifling innovative argument. A judge need not intervene nor reject counter-intuitive argumentation using this simple test. Ulrich's[6] claim that the tabula rasa judge should only require that the debater present "a reason" for the argument falls short of achieving the goal of eliminating truly poor arguments which are offered only in the hope they will be overlooked or misanalyzed by an opponent.

Another practical modifying component of the tabula rasa paradigm involves what Rowland calls "comprehensibility".[7] He suggests that a judge must understand the fundamental thrust of the argument. He notes that the response to a cost disadvantage that declares simply "non-unique-Reagan denies" may be perfectly comprehensible in the context of a round. It posits that the experience of current executive policies provides that the disadvantage will or should already have occurred. On the other hand if this terse statement is not contextually supported it fails the comprehensibility test. Again the caveat is offered that judges need not agree with the reasoning or evidence behind the claim, but merely understand it.

Many of the current debate practices that are felt to be repugnant by some coaches (speed, tactical argumentation, evidence overload, etc.) are merely responses to a changing society. The printing glut, the technology explosion, the increased sophistication of the social sciences and finally and perhaps most critically the hegemony of the Xerox machine have all increased the quality and quantity of data available to contemporary debaters. These external factors cannot of course be altered. The question becomes what adjustments are in the best interests of the activity? The tabula rasa modifications suggested above can help us avoid "future shock".

We shall now examine some of Mr. Phillips' recommendations and a few counter-proposals. I heartily endorse the first suggestion on prepared judge philosophy sheets in advance. I have long been an advocate of this practice. A few cautionary words however: make sure they are updated and make sure they are followed. One irritation connected with this otherwise laudable practice is the debaters' tendencies to capitalize on "buzz phrases" from judge philosophies. This practice makes debaters obsequious rather than persuasive.

The second recommendation suggests that judges take a more active role in critiquing the debaters' skills. Certainly it is valuable for debaters to pick up tips from educator-judges. Two previously dealt with concepts should be applied her: 1. the inquiry approach to learning and 2. not all judges are good teachers. In a debate round it is not always easy to divorce form from content. This gestalt concept makes it difficult to critique one facet independently,

Mr. Phillips' third recommendation regarding using speaker points punitively may create more problems that it solves. Certainly, blatantly unethical practices should result in very low speaker points. However, using low points "to reinforce their comments" is a dangerous concept. These attempts at behavior modification seldom have positive results on the debaters. Some tournaments drop high and low points to determine teams advancing to elimination rounds and the "low point" doctrine may merely increase the "drop high and low" practice. Certainly Mr. Phillips' observation about the "rep" teams getting consistently high points regardless of the quality of their performance, points out a weakness on the part of judges. The answer here is not to encourage the "gratuitous violence" approach of giving low points for arguments deemed unworthy by a judge. Mr. Phillips' fourth and fifth recommendations may be more valuable means of improving the quality of judging and the overall educational effect of the activity.

Mr. Phillips' final suggestions call for improving the quality of judging through the efforts of the debate community. It would be difficult to dispute the need for this kind of action. The problem becomes implementation. We should not merely say "ain't it awful" without seeking arenas for improving our judging. We cannot sit in the coaches' lounge and talk about the glory days when "giants walked the earth" or merely "react" to situations, we should act. Forums like this can be regional in scope also. Individual NFL districts can cooperate with institutions of higher learning to hold workshops and encourage the inclusion of improved judging techniques into course

content. Mr. Phillips and I are in complete agreement that we need not point fingers of blame at various segments of the debate community but rather we should seek the common road. Some of our veteran coaches and directors of forensics are judging less frequently. This is a pattern that could be dangerous.

The answers to our questions do not lie in the restriction and regulation approach. Regulation of practices is the antithesis of academic freedom. Already some incursions have taken place. The NFL rule banning judges from reading evidence at the end of the round has created more problems that it has solved. It may be well-intentioned to say that since we are an "oral activity" everything should be immediately intelligible. This has not improved the quality of judging. A tabula rasa approach prevents the judge from "reading into" a quotation. If the evidence was not heard clearly in the round then the evidence has not met the "comprehensibility" standard advocated above. My fear is that regulatory efforts could snowball and soon we will have tinkered with the machinery to the point that it will fail to function. We should not attempt to fix something which is not broken. The advocacy process we teach is structurally sound. Innovations and modifications of specific practices should be tested as part of that process. Currently I think high school debate is as good as I've seen it in the last 25 years. Students must know more; they must think in a more sophisticated manner and they recognize rational arguments better than their predecessors.

We must above all continue to keep debate amenable to change and adaptation. We may not always know the best way but perhaps it is in

the attempt to seek the best that we find our most precious educational benefit. Dr. Rohrer offered these words that I think give perspective to our efforts, "When truth is known there is no need for debate. Controvery is alien to a perfect society."[8]

FOOTNOTES

1. Daniel M. Rohrer, "Debate as a Liberal Art", in David Thomas ed. Advanced Debate: Readings in Theory, Practice and Teaching. (Lincolnwood, Ill.-National Textbook Co.,1979) p.10

2. Bill Balthrop, "Citizen, Legislator and Bureacrat as Evaluators of Competing Policy Systems", in David Thomas Ed., Advanced Debate: Readings in Theory, Practice and Teaching. (Lincolnwood, Ill.-National Textbook co., 1979) p. 404

3. David Zarefsky and Bill Henderson, "Hypothesis Testing in Theory and Practic", Journal of the American Forensic Association, Vol. XIX No. 3 Winter 1983 p. 180.

4. Zarefsky and Henderson, p. 180.

5. Robert Rowland, "The Debate Judge as Debate Judge: a Functional Paradigm for Evaluating Debates", Journal of the American Forensic Association., Vo. XX No. 4 Spring 1984 p. 187.

6. Walter Ulrich, "Debate as Dialectic: A Defense of the Tabula Rasa", Journal of the American Forensic Association, Vol. XXI No. 2 Fall 1984, p. 89.

7. Robert Rowland, "The Debate Judge as Debate Judge", p. 187.

8. Rohrer, p.8

Judging: A Response

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Prepared as a response to:
Leslie Phillips
"The Debate Judge as Educator"
for the NFL Conference

Kansas City, Missouri
August 1985

Winston Churchill at the Yalta Conference found himself in a unique position. He was present with his two greatest Allies, coordinating the final pages of his great crusade in Europe. The war aims were close to reaching fruition, but with victory in sight he found himself increasingly at variance with his great friend Roosevelt. The seeds of victory were unraveling the very justification for unity. The literature about the role of the judge in debate, creates the sense of a similar dilemma. We all hold similar views about the relationship of the judge to the future of debate, but I find dissension among the Allies. The decisions we can make carry the potential of success and growth or the seeds of disintegration and disaster. What mystifies me the most is the degree of unanimity prevalent about the relationship between the debaters and the judge, and the subsequent inability to reach a unified position regarding the nature of the judges roll in educational debate.

This paper was formulated as a response to Leslie Phillips "The Debate Judge as Educator". Let me begin and end with the areas of our greatest agreement, for it is in this that a small change will bring about profound reshaping of the direction of debate. The paramount job of the judge is as educator, it is for education alone that the debate activity is justified. This seems the consensus position of most of the debate community and provides a fine standard for evaluation of any reform. Both the debaters[1] and most textbook editors agree. Rowland presents the case most clearly through his Debate Judge paradigm[2] which provides an objective framework to implement the concept of the judge as educator. First consensus position should be a clear awareness of critic/educator.

The central skills to all debate are those manifest by the concept of argumentation. Within this field a second consensus position should emerge. Phillips argues as his first modest proposal a minor change with profound

possibilities for rejuvenating academic debate. "Judges should issue a reasonably detailed statement of their judging philosophy before the round begins."[3] He argues in practical terms the consequences of the effect in individual rounds, and Phillips is correct. We can only expect people to respond as we would like to see them perform, if we let them know what behavior we find desirable.

Central to all instruction in debate are critical thinking skills, yet these are not taught divorced from persuasion, rather these skills are a means to achieve a favorable response from a critic audience. Only, in high school debate is it demanded that students evaluate the nature of their audience soley through nonverbal signals and clues. This is not a standard we apply in any other context. For if we model debate as advocacy, then also modeled should be the legal voir dire or the media's marketing analysis. In both areas communications decisions are only made after examining closely audience personality. This is a means to gain a control over the audience by understanding its behavioral expectations. If we model debate as an educational activity, then within should be an academic persuasion model which is complete in form, not just a partial model. Classroom teachers outline performance objectives which clearly tell students expected behavior for academic success. We give them a firm idea of audience expectations. Similarly, as debate teachers, we need to outline our performance objectives prior to each round.

At the heart of any persuasion is communication. Richard provides the key almost forty years ago, "Communications take place when one mind so acts upon its environment that another mind is influenced ..."[4] That interaction has been noted to be unique to the individuals involved and to depend upon style variable of the speaker and the audience.[5] It would seem to follow that the

more a student knew about a potential judge the stronger the efficacy of debate as a tool of argumentation becomes. Sandell notes that that, "... style variables do exert influence on the persuasion process."[6] This is not surprising to the debate community, what is surprising is the only influence style has on a round of debate is in the judges reaction, usually on the ballot, to the debaters. What is missing is the interaction which should come from the students of persuasion. How far we are from other teachers of critical thinking. Consider McDonald's admonition to his students of writing:

> Good writing is that which gets the result you want. And a knowledge of the techniques of of persuasion will help you to win whatever you're after.... To make a persuasive case, you have to know the character of your audience. This will help you to choose your words and shape your style.[7]

In written advocacy, style is molded to the demands of the audience. In oral advocacy too, style is most effective if it meets the audience style. The Phillips proposal would bring debate up to the standards which are assumed in the rest of the academic community, and would allow the teaching we do in the area of judge adaption and paradigms to be put into practice. Many of these kids are so uncertain about motivation and persuasion they don't even know enough about the opposite sex to get a date. So perhaps a more realistic standard would be to inform them of our unique standards, and then hold them responsible to adapt to judge differences. Second consensus position should be that it is desirable to have the judge let the student debaters know something about individual judging preferences.

Is there an appropriate means of identifying ideal judging standards? Can we find and accept a universal judging paradigm? Phillips identifies tabula rasa,

as modified, as an acceptable standard. There is much merit in what he says, however this standard seems to ignore much of what debate is about. Initially, an advocacy of a particular standard and then elaboration. Rowland, in his "The Debate Judge as Debate Judge:A Functional Paradigm for Evaluating Debates"[8], identifies a standard which is clear and makes sense to the critic educator. Herein lies much that each debate coach tries to do. This might be a synthesis of what Phillips would argue, perhaps not. Rowland argues that a judging model exists, which is that of the debate teacher. This model requires that certain stock issues are identified in such a manner that the responsibilities of debating are met, while retaining an equal burden for the affirmative and negative teams. Rowland paradigm provides a functional model for rendering decisions based upon the teaching nature of academic debate. While this model avoids "real world decision making" process it provide a sensible standard for the world of debate.

Briefly, the model adopts the following parameters. Topicality is the better definition standard, wherein "the judge evaluates topicality by comparing the topicality arguments made by the affirmative and negative and accepting the superior definition."[9] Functionally, the teams weigh, limit and/or expand the areas of topicality. Presumption is mooted unless,"... a debate were to end in an exact tie. In such an unlikely event the negative would win."[10] Rowland clarifies this rule as a "stipulated standard."[11] "Minimum burden of proof standard"[12] is a functional standard which demands that each argument meet "the minimum standard for reasoning and proof"[13] or that argument will not be considered in the debate.

> The minimum burden of proof standard should not be too high....However, the standard must be strict enough to deter bad argument. The most appropriate minimum standard for evaluating burden of proof is argument comprehensibility. The judge should evaluate probabilistically any argument which is defended with both a reason and evidence that the judge perceives as supporting the argument.[14]

Functionally, this standard demands equal burdens from each team. Allowance is made for the variable nature of each judge, while demanding of the debaters a clear development of each argument in the sure knowledge that this judges wants adequate proof. Advantages and disadvantages as well as inherency and solvency are viewed as mirror concepts demanding equal affirmative and negative responsibilities. The beauty of the functional paradigm is its marked focus upon the activity of debate. This paradigm allows the debate instructor to clearly explain the functions of various argumentation skills. The framework retains much of the desired fairness of the concept of Tąbula Rasa, while providing a manageable means to avoid the abuses of non-critical judging. Rowland retains the diversity which Phillips and I find desirable, and sustaining, "objectivity, freedom from bias, an emphasis on the student's argument rather than the judge's preconception."[15]

The Debate Judge paradigm retains many features to recommend it as the forensic communities agreed general paradigm. Though a closer reading and a more elaborate explanation would be needed to do Rowland and the paradigm justice. It promotes the educational function of the critic, for within the model is the direct invitation to evaluate the presentation of argument. It safeguards fairness as a preeminent standard. Yet further, it allows the forensic community to develop and present other paradigms with practical and philosophical use

within the debate round. The Debate Judge view is not strictly hostile to a comparative, evaluative or even philosophical paradigm but rather encourages full student development of the paradigm. The more familiar paradigms can be used to further elaborate the judges personal perspective. With adoption of this standard the door is still open to expanded theory approaches to the concepts of decision making in debate, but a consistent approach is provided to help train the new judge. The Debate Judge paradigm is relatively easy to explain, and if somewhat divorced from the tactical nuances of other paradigms. Most importantly, adoption of the Debate Judge paradigm, involves recognition of the first consensus position, educator/critic and invites a third consensus position: that the nature of debate should frame a critic paradigm consistent with the nature of the activity and complimentary to its educational goals. Agreement is close, for even with a games perspective, the functional approach provides boundaries which fairly administer the event.

It is neither desirable not feasible to require that all judges adopt the Debate Judge paradigm, as it is also distasteful to require a minimum level of knowledge about debate in order to qualify as a judge. Just as the trial lawyer must balance the jurors innocence of law with the judges superior knowledge, so to in debate must we balance judges with extensive expertise in debate theory with those who come prejudice free. The debater should not always be guaranteed a judge who understands the protocol of debate. Diversity is the nature of the activity and there exist a number of fine reasons for encouraging as wide a judging pool as feasible. The possibilities of variety in a potential audience can be suggested easily. The benefits of utilizing non-critic/educator judges, however, come from two specific areas. It is the best means of bringing

the real world into debate. The critic/educator must place more emphasis on the structure of the proof over the intuitive truth of the issue. Most lay judges are as conscientious about decision making as the best expert judges, and most are as fully developed in their decision making paradigms. What differs is that this public audience demands proofs of a different nature. They find themselves more comfortable using ethos and pathos as a part of the decision process. Yet, the efficacy of any case is still judged upon its merits. Who presented the better case and will it work? This is still the central focus of all lay judges. The benefit then is that this lay person is able to impart the fullness of the nature of advocacy, free of the rules we rightfully allow as personal constraints.

The second benefit has proved to be of more lasting value to the growth and promotion of the debate activity. I come from a state with small communities a long way apart. Our closest tournament is fifty miles. Three hundred miles is not an unusual distance to travel for a weekend meet. It is impossible to transport the number of judges the distances required in order to insure that each judge is minimally qualified, though some of our meet directors have valiantly tried. We have found this seeming deficit to be of great value. Each weekend our students face new judges, not the same judges as the last three weekends. But more specifically, this is the second benefit, use of local, "untrained" judges has increased the profile of debate within our communities. We found that after one or two years of judging, the judges make sure the host has them on the list to judge the next year. We find that the topics of conversation at the local cafe now center on the basketball team and the debate team. And this all takes place with only a small loss in the ability to

coach a team. It is as easy to develop a judges file for each community person as it is to do a file on a more experienced judge. So, even if these judges can not meet an ideal standard of what a judge should be, from the standpoint of strengthening the activity, it makes excellent sense to use lay judges.

Two natural controls exist to insure that use of lay judges does not distort the educational nature of debate. Trained judges will still be used. At most meets, the coaches are needed to fill spaces on the judging roster. Certainly, some tournaments can be designated as expert critic judge tournament. A natural would be those meets hosted by Universities or round robin tournaments. But the most important control is the second consensus position. If all judges spend a minute and discuss themselves and the judging ideas, the students know right away something about the judge around which can be built the basis of their appeals. This discussion would ease even the more inexperienced judges into the round. It is ok if you tell them you've never judged a round, the debaters will help you with the format. How much more easily this simple device would place new judges into their first round. Additionally, fewer judges would be surprised at the way debate has changed since they last debated. Use of community people can enhance the students opportunities to learn about people, but it also enhances our image in the eyes of those who support and fund our activities. A consideration as important to the continuation of debate as the absolute speed of a word in flight.

Lay judges need not be ignorant of the activity. Like a new coach, a novice judge wants to do a better job. The Debate Judge paradigm provide a perfect format to provide to a new judge. Relatively free of jargon, this paradigm works from the position of common sense, and thus demands less prior

knowledge of the event in order to understand. These judges will become more expert as their time of service extends and will develop a fuller understanding of this and other paradigms, but they will still remain lay. We tend to spend a good deal of time in the artificial environment of the speech tournament. It is necessary to involve those from outside our world in order to fully understand how our games fit within the educational context of the larger community. This cooperation with lay judges is a perfect means to involve the community with us, and to verify that those skills we teach are skills we are willing to share with the world.

Care needs to be exercised toward the steps taken to create judge training. All judges need some training, if just to know where the tab room is and how to fill out a ballot. The provision of specific standards outside of a general paradigm would tend to limit the diversity of unique judging attitudes, and would unduly influence decisions. Further, it would seem that any trend toward greater judge training reverses the traditional burden placed upon the student to persuaded the judge irrespective of the judges background, rather it focuses upon the quality of the judge as a decision maker. Most judges are qualified, each brings a unique set of attitudes and values to the round. It is up to the debaters to find the key which unlocks that judge's desires.

I find no contradiction between the concept of the lay judges and the concept of the educator/critic judges. I feel that these roles can be performed for mutual support by different judges, but I also feel that the lay judge is fully capable of fulfilling the role of educator and critic. This does not , however, seem to be the majority view which Phillips supports. Freely suggests, "... judges must be able to bring to bear a comprehensive knowledge of the

principles of argumentation and debate in order to evaluate the arguments advanced for their decision."[16] Flood and Cripe say, "A competent judge studies theory carefully and knows what debaters are talking about when they discuss inherency, disadvantages, or the theory of a counterplan,"[17] and they decry the fact that, "many who know next to nothing about debate are allowed to judge."[18] Yet sorting out exactly how this applies is difficult. For what exactly must a judge know about counterplan theory? Two kinds of mutual exclusivity and which one is acceptable and which one is not? No, these arguments the students can raise and debate. This is their domain. I tend to agree with Sanders, "The entirety of academic debate, as taught today, should have an application in the real world."[19] And the real world is best introduced, not by always having the same kind of judge, but rather through experiencing a variety of styles and experience. Judge qualifications are not, however, the issue of greatest concern, for if each judge will let the students know something about them before the round, the question of needed "quality" is diminished.

This does not mean an end to a search for standards, nor is it a plea for ignorance in judges, rather it is a case for some clear, general guidelines which can be provided to tournament directors and debate coaches in order to provide coherence to judging. Maybe standards like the three minimum expectations put forth by Patterson and Zarefsky would suffice:

1. That the judge is interested and attentive to the debate.
2. That the judge is unbiased toward the subject being discussed.
3. That the judge is intelligent and capable of listening carefully to arguments and evidence, drawing reasonable inferences, and applying common sense to the debaters' ideas.[20]

If these three are clarified with a functional paradigm, and if judges have clear instructions to discuss themselves as judges for the debaters; then the necessary parameters exist. All else should invite diversity.

It is appropriate that we have and maintain disagreements about debating. It is likewise appropriate that we attempt to clarify and defend our practices. Yet whatever changes we make should look to maintenance of the expanded view of what debate is and what it does. Let us not lose sight of our two great allies, our students and our community, instead of experiencing Churchill's frustration upon termination of his great crusade, let us instead perpetuate quality debating. Sanders refers to the serendipity of the activity.[21] This is a marvalous war to think of this wonderful sport.

Diversity is our all.

Notes

1. See Ronald J. Matlon and Lucy M. Keele, "A Survey of Participants in the National Debate Tournament, 1947-1980,"Journal of the American Forensics Association, Spring 1984, pp. 194-205.

2. Robert C. Rowland, "The Debate Judge as Debate Judge:A Functional Paradigm for Evaluating Debates,"Journal of the American Forensics Association, Spring 1984, pp. 183-193. See Also V. William Balthrop, "The Debate Judge as 'Critic of Argument':Toward a Transcendent Perspective," Journal of the American Forensics Association, Summer 1983, pp. 1-15.

3. Leslie Phillips, "The Debate Judge as Educator", in manuscript-Prepared for the NFL Conference on the Future of High School Debate, Aug. 1985, p. 11.

4. George N. Gordon, Persuasion:The Theory and Practice of Manipulative Communication, Hastings House:New York, 1971, p. 3.

5. Rolf Sandell, Linguistic Style and Persuasion, Academic Press:London, 1977.

6. Sandell, p. 229.

7. Daniel McDonald, The Language of Argument, Harper & Row:New York, 1983, p. 3.

8. Rowland, pp. 183-193.

9. Rowland, p. 185.

10. Rowland, p. 186.

11. Rowland, p. 186.

12. Rowland, p. 186.

13. Rowland, p. 186.

14. Rowland, p. 186-187.

15. Phillips, p. 10.

16. Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, Wadsworth:Belmont, Cal., 1981, p. 262.

17. Royce E. Flood and Nicholas M. Cripe, Modern Competitive Debate, Poppenberg's Press:Amherst, NY, 1982, p. 121.

18. Flood and Cripe, p. 121.

19. Gerald H. Sanders, Introduction to Contemporary Academic Debate, Waveland Press:Prospect Heights, Ill, 1983, p. 138.

20. J.W. Patterson and David Zarefsky, Contemporary Debate, Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 1983, p. 295.

21. Sanders, p.3.